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We use recently collected retrospective survey data to estimate the displacement effect of pension
wealth on household savings. The third wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe, SHARELIFE, collects information on the entire job history of the respondent, a fea-
ture missing in most previous studies. We show that addressing measurement error problems
is crucial to estimate the displacement effect when using survey data. We find that each euro of
pension wealth is associated with a 47 (61) cent decline in non–pension wealth using robust (me-
dian) regression. In the presence of biases from measurement errors and omitted (unobserved)
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ferent from zero. Instrumental variables regression estimates, although less precise, suggest full
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1. Introduction
The demographic challenge of ageing populations has led and will lead European
countries to reform their pension systems. For policymakers, understanding the effect
that pension reforms will have on household and national saving is crucial. In particular,
the effect of changes in pension wealth on private wealth is vital information for assessing
the welfare effects of these reforms. A stylized version of the life–cycle model suggests
that generous social security benefits will have a negative effect on the accumulation of
private savings if households save only for retirement, i.e. crowding out of private wealth
by pension wealth. However, the extent to which households offset pension wealth with
other forms of wealth accumulation is difficult to gauge. From a theoretical point of view,
the extent of the offset depends on a variety of other factors, such as the presence of bind-
ing liquidity constraints, the distortional effects of taxation and the fact that households
might save for reasons other than retirement or may lack a basic level of financial liter-
acy. From an empirical point of view, the econometric identification of the offset is made
difficult by the lack of data on lifetime earnings and by the fact that pension wealth is
typically measured with error in surveys.
In this paper we estimate whether and to what extent European households offset
pension wealth with private savings. An innovative aspect of our paper is that we use
retrospective data from the third wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARELIFE), which collects information on the entire job and wage histories of
older workers and retirees in 13 European countries. In this way we are able to construct
measures for both the present value of past and future earnings and pension wealth at
the individual level, a feature missing in most studies estimating the displacement effect.
Many papers have made attempts to estimate the displacement effect but the empir-
ical evidence is mixed. In his seminal article, Feldstein (1974) uses aggregate time-series
data for the US and shows that a 1 dollar in increase in Social Security Wealth (SSW) de-
presses private saving by about 40 dollar cents. However, Feldstein and Liebman (2002)
point out that this estimate of the displacement effect might be inconsistent because of
aggregation problems. For that reason many papers have used cross-section data to
investigate the level of displacement between SSW and wealth (see e.g. Feldstein and
Pellechio (1979), Dicks-Mireaux and King (1984), Hubbard (1986) and Jappelli (1995)).
In these earlier studies non-pension wealth is typically regressed on cash earnings and
pension wealth (and some other controls). Gale (1998) convincingly shows that in such
regressions the estimated displacement effect is biased downwards. He proposes and
applies a method to remove this bias, which boils down to multiply pension wealth by
an age-specific adjustment factor, called “Gale’s Q”. He finds an estimated offset close to
100% for a sample of US households in which the head is employed and aged between 40
and 64. Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) use time
series of cross-section data to estimate saving rate equations derived from life–cycle mod-
els, exploiting pension reforms in the United Kingdom and Italy respectively to identify
the displacement effect. Their results indicate that the effects of pensions on wealth vary
significantly across households, with nearly retired individuals showing more crowd out
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than young workers. Engelhardt and Kumar (2011) use data on 51-61 years old working
individuals from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the US and adopt an instru-
mental variables approach to account for measurement error in wealth and individual
heterogeneity, such as taste for saving. They find an average displacement effect between
53 and 67 percent. However, quantile estimates show substantial heterogeneity across
the wealth distribution, with crowd–in at lower quantiles, no offset at the median and
significant crowd–out for affluent households. Kapteyn et al. (2005) exploit productivity
differences across cohorts and the introduction of social security in the Netherlands to
find a small but statistically significant displacement effect of 11.5%. Hurd et al. (2009)
use cross-country variation and cross-sectional variation in education and marital status
to identify the displacement effect on financial wealth from a pooled sample of retired
males aged 65 to 75 from the HRS, ELSA (UK) and SHARE (ten continental European
countries). To pool these samples, all variables are aggregated by education and marital
status. Their estimated displacement effect ranges between 23 and 44 percent.
We contribute to the literature by presenting new estimates of the displacement effect
using micro data on both older workers and retired individuals collected by the SHARE-
LIFE project in 13 European countries. Opposite to Hurd et al. (2009) and like Gale (1998)
and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011), we perform our analysis on a cross-section of house-
holds. Thanks to the retrospective nature of the data, we are able to construct a measure
of the present value of past earnings using the entire job history of each respondent and
the information on the first wage earned in each job. With the exception of Engelhardt
and Kumar (2011), all previous studies instead had to rely on proxy measures for past
earnings, most notably current income, age, education and marital status. Moreover, ac-
tual pension benefits for those that are retired allow us to construct pension wealth; for
the non-retired, we use subjective information on individuals’ expected retirement age
and replacement rate to compute expected pension wealth. We show that the retrospec-
tive survey data are able to generate cross-country differences in wages and pensions, as
well as age-earnings profiles that are in line with expectations.
An important econometric phenomenon both in this study and the empirical literature
discussed above is the impact of measurement errors on the parameter estimates. Both
pension wealth and the present value of past and future earnings are typically measured
with error, if not unobserved. Typically, these two measurement errors are positively cor-
related with each other. We show in Section 2.1 that the bias which stems from those two
positively correlated measurement errors, might well lead to a spurious positive partial
correlation between pension wealth and private wealth. Therefore, we introduce a re-
stricted model for which we can sign the impact of correlated measurement errors on the
estimators. Furthermore, we provide lower bounds to the true offset using a sample of
retirees, for whom we know lifetime income and pension wealth from two independent
series of survey questions. Although both are measured with error, the correlation be-
tween these measurement errors is likely to be small or even negligible. We cannot make
this claim for the non–retired included in the full sample, for whom we infer pension
benefits from multiplying the (individual-specific) expected pension income replacement
rate by current income, which essentially imposes correlation between the measurement
3
errors.
The estimated displacement effect for the full sample is equal to 47.1% using robust
regression and 60.9% using median regression techniques, and in both cases significantly
different from zero and 100%. We obtain lower bounds between 17% and 30%, signif-
icantly different from zero. When we use financial wealth as the dependent variable
instead of net worth, we estimate the crowd-out to be between 77.8% and 87.0%, and
obtain a lower bound between 53% and 69%. Using the Instrumental Variable strategy
of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2008) to avoid attenuation bias from measurement
errors and unobserved heterogeneity, we obtain less precise estimates which suggest full
displacement.
In the remainder of this paper, we first present a simple life-cycle model to guide our
empirical analysis in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the variables used in this study and
the assumptions we made in the computation of lifetime earnings and pension wealth.
Section 4 presents the results and several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
4
2. Model
As most studies on this subject, we derive the equation of interest from a simple life–
cycle model, which is the discrete–time counterpart of Gale (1998). Like Gale, we as-
sume that past changes in the pension system have been fully anticipated by the agents
at the beginning of their life. We ignore uncertainty and liquidity constraints, and as-
sume perfect capital markets that produce a constant real interest rate, r. Moreover, we
assume that the retirement age, R, and non capital income at age τ, yτ, are exogenous
variables. The within period utility function is assumed to be isoelastic (constant relative



























(1 + r)1−τBτ (1b)
where cτ denotes consumption at age τ, Eτ pre–retirement earnings, Bτ pension benefits,
ρ is the discount rate, L the maximum age and γ the coefficient of relative risk aversion.



















where λ = ((1+r)/(1+ρ))
1/γ
1+r . By definition, wealth at the end of period t, At is equal to




























is the so-called "Gale’s Q" (see Gale (1998) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011)). Using (1b),





















(1 + r)t−τBτ denotes pension wealth at age t, i.e. the present value of
pension benefits.
2.1. Empirical implementation
Expression (5) leads to the following equation to be estimated for the sample of retired
and non-retired individuals:



















(1 + r)t−τBτ ("Q adjusted pension wealth")
xt= a vector of demographic household characteristics that might affect savings.
The main parameter of interest is β2, which measures the extent of displacement between
discretionary household wealth and pension wealth. The canonical life–cycle model
sketched above predicts full displacement (β2 = −1) and β1 = 1. However, the ex-
tent of displacement might be smaller because of factors which are not considered in the
canonical model such as (binding) liquidity constraints, uncertainty, endogeneity of the
retirement decision and lack of financial literacy. Gale (1998) and Engelhardt and Kumar
(2011) also use equation (6) as the basis of their empirical work. In the earlier literature
(see e.g. Jappelli (1995) and Hubbard (1986)) the pension wealth variable is typically not
interacted with the adjustment factor Q. Gale (1998) points out that this might lead to a
considerable underestimation of the crowding out effect. At the same time, Gale (1998, p.
711) shows that the Q-adjustment is also valid even if the true model does not embody
perfect offset.
One of the attractive features of the SHARE survey is that it contains sufficient retro-
spective and prospective information to proxy the variables z∗1t and z
∗
2t in a convincing
way without relying on too many arbitrary assumptions. Gale (1998), who uses the 1983
wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), instead does not observe directly the
present value of past and current earnings (i.e the first term of z1t). He therefore replaces
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the z∗1t regressor in equation (6) with the following variables: current income, age of the
head of household and his/her spouse and earnings interacted with age and other de-
mographic factors.1 This approximation procedure, which is also used in many other
studies, might provide rather imprecise proxies and consequently might lead to an in-
consistent estimate of the displacement effect. As far as we know, Engelhardt and Kumar
(2011) is the only other study to use a direct measure for the present value of past earn-
ings, which stems from administrative records and is consequently precisely measured.
As we said before, our empirical specification is based on a very stylized version of
the life cycle model. Blau (2011) formulates a richer economic model which takes into ac-
count, amongst other things, endogenous retirement choice, uncertainties and stochastic
income profiles. He uses his model to generate a simulated dataset on which he fits the
linear specification of Gale. He finds that this linear model over–estimates the crowd-out
effect. However, Blau shows that the coefficient for pension wealth is much closer to the
true displacement effect, if one adds lagged wealth to the static model of Gale. The ad-
vantage of the dynamic specification is that it controls for initial conditions such as the
present value of past earnings. We believe that our model is more similar to the dynamic
specification because we control for lifetime earnings in the equation.
Our first results were rather disappointing and completely refuted the basic life–cycle
model: we found a negative OLS estimate for β1 and a positive estimate for β2. How-
ever, we argue that these results could be driven by serious measurement error problems:
instead of z∗1 and z
∗
2
2, we observe the error ridden variables z1 and z2:
zk = z∗k + ηk, k = 1, 2 (7)
As we explain in more detail in Section 3, there are two main reasons for measurement
errors in these variables. First, the wage earned (or pension benefit received) may be re-
ported incorrectly. Second, we interpolate the wages and extrapolate pension benefits to
compute the lifetime wage path and pension wealth, which is obviously a simplification
of reality. Moreover, it is rather likely that in our data the measurement errors η1 and η2
are positively correlated with each other: Cov(η1, η2) ≥ 0. On top of this we make the
following assumptions about the measurement errors:
• E(ηkz∗k) = E(ηkε) = E(ηk) = 0, k = 1, 2
• E(ηkx) = 0, k = 1, 2
• E(η1z∗2) = E(η2z∗1) = 0
• Var(ηk) = σ2ηk , k = 1, 2; Cov(η1, η2) = ση1η2 ≥ 0 (homoskedasticity)
1In Appendix B, we show the results when applying Gale (1998)’s method to the SHARE dataset. We
obtain positive but insignificant estimates of the displacement effect, contrary to Gale. Our result can be
explained by the presence of correlated measurement errors in income and pension wealth, as we detail in
Appendix B. For the SCF, such a problem does not occur.
2From now onwards, we drop the t index for notational convenience.
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Substitution of equation (7) into (6) yields
A = β0 + β1z1 + β2z2 + x′γ + ε− β1η1 − β2η2 (8)
The linear projection Eˆ∗(A|1, z1, z2,x) is equal to
Eˆ∗(A|1, z1, z2,x) = β0 + β1z1 + β2z1 + x′γ + Eˆ∗(ε|1, z1, z2,x)−
β1Eˆ∗(η1|1, z1, z2,x)− β2Eˆ∗(η2|1, z1t, z2t,x) (9)
Given our assumptions on the measurement errors, one can easily show that Eˆ∗(ε|1, z1, z2,x) =





x) be the projection coefficients of (z1, z2,x) in Eˆ∗(ηk|1, z1, z2,x), k = 1, 2. By
the projection formula (see Hayashi (2000, Section 2.9)): θ1z1θ1z2
θ1x
 =
 Var(z1) Cov(z1, z2) Cov(z1,x′)Cov(z2, z1) Var(z2) Cov(z2,x′)
Cov(x, z1) Cov(x, z2) Var(x)
−1 Cov(z1, η1)Cov(z2, η1)
Cov(x, η1)
 (10)
Given our assumptions, Cov(z2, η1) = ση1η2 ≥ 0 and Cov(x, η1) = 0. Obviously,
Cov(z1, η1) = Var(η1) = σ2η1 . Therefore, the projection coefficients can be rewritten as θ1z1θ1z2
θ1x
 = σ2η1a1 + ση1η2a2 (11)
where a1 and a2 are respectively the first and second column of the inverse variance-
covariance matrix  Var(z1) Cov(z1, z2) Cov(z1,x′)Cov(z2, z1) Var(z2) Cov(z2,x′)




 = σ2η2a2 + ση1η2a1 (12)
Therefore the biases in the OLS estimators βˆOLS1 and βˆ
OLS
2 are equal to
plim βˆOLS1 − β1 = −β1(σ2η1 a11 + ση1η2 a21)− β2(σ2η2 a21 + ση1η2 a11)
= −(β1σ2η1 + β2ση1η2)a11 − (β2σ2η2 + β1ση1η2)a21 (13)
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and
plim βˆOLS2 − β2 = −β2(σ2η2 a22 + ση1η2 a21)− β1(σ2η1 a21 + ση1η2 a22)
= −(β2σ2η2 + β1ση1η2)a22 − (β1σ2η1 + β2ση1η2)a21 (14)
The direction of the asymptotic bias in the OLS estimator βˆOLS1 depends on the signs of
the elements in the vector a1. The first element of a1, a11, is unambiguously positive
(it is a diagonal element of the inverse of a variance-covariance matrix). The second
element a21 is presumably negative because one would expect that Cov(z1, z2) > 0 and
that the correlation between (z1, z2) and x is not unusually large. In our data aˆ21 is indeed
negative. Equation (13) suggests that under the validity of the simple life–cycle model









the OLS estimator βˆOLS1 is downward biased. The first term on the right hand side of
equation (13), (−(β1σ2η1 + β2ση1η2)a11) depicts the usual (downward) attenuation bias.
The second term on the right hand side of equation (13) reveals that, since aˆ21 is actually
smaller than zero, the measurement error in z2t aggravates the downward bias in βˆOLS1 .
The estimator could even converge in probability to a negative number! Along the same
line of reasoning one can argue that βˆOLS2 is upward biased and that the upward bias in
this OLS estimate is exacerbated by the measurement error in z1. As we said before, we
find that the OLS estimate of β2 is positive. In other words, measurement error problems
could drive the estimation results indicated above.3 The OLS estimate of the displace-
ment effect presented by Engelhardt and Kumar (2011) also suggests pensions wealth
crowds in non–pension wealth. We believe that their OLS estimate of the displacement
effect is severely upward biased because the measurement errors in their right hand side
variables "current earnings" and "Q adjusted pension wealth" are likely to be positively
correlated.4
In order to be able to sign the bias associated with the measurement error problem, we
impose the restriction β1 = 1 in the estimation. In other words, we estimate the following
model instead of equation (8):
A− z1 = β0 + β2z2 + x′γ + ε− η1 − β2η2 (16)
3This line of reasoning extends directly to applying Gale (1998)’s method, as we document in Appendix
B.




(1 + r)t−τEτ) but proxy this
regressor by a survey measure of current earnings, age, expected retirement age and region of birth plus
some interaction terms. They address the measurement error in the pension wealth variable by adopting
IV estimation. However, they do not take into account that the measurement error in current earnings
might affect their estimate of the displacement effect.
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It is easy to show that in this case the bias in the OLS estimator βˆOLS2 is equal to
plim βˆOLS2 − β2 = −(ση1η2 + β2σ2η2)a˜11 (17)




Obviously, a˜11 > 0. In case of 1) full displacement (β2 = −1), 2) zero correlation between
x and z2, 3) nonnegatively correlated measurement errors (ση1η2 ≥ 0) and 4) under as-
sumption (15b), equation (17) implies that the OLS estimate for β2 is upward biased and
that−1 < plim βˆOLS2 < 0.5 If there is only partial displacement (−1 < β2 < 0), we cannot
determine the direction (upward or downward) of the bias in the OLS estimate. In the
empirical section we will carry out a sensitivity analysis in which we estimate model (16)
on the subsample of retirees. As we will explain in the next section, for this subsample
the measurement errors in z∗1t and z
∗
2t are likely to be uncorrelated (ση1η2 = 0). In that
case, the estimate of the displacement coefficient will be attenuated irrespective of the
true value of β2. However, we still learn something from the estimation using both re-
tired and non-retired individuals. Even in the presence of measurement error in pension
wealth we would expect that the estimate of the displacement coefficient is negative.6
In order to address the measurement error problem, one could opt for IV estimation
as in Engelhardt and Kumar (2011). Like Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) and Attanasio
and Rohwedder (2003), they point out that Q adjusted pension wealth should be instru-
mented for other reasons, such as omitted variable bias resulting from unobserved het-
erogeneity. For instance, some ’patient’ households may have a high taste for saving. We
pursue this strategy in Section 4.1. In all cases, to limit the impact of outliers (e.g. due to













< 1 and consequently −1 < plim βˆOLS2 < 0. In our data, the correlation
between z2 and x is low enough, as we find that a˜11 ×Var(z2) = 1.30× 0.68 = 0.884, and hence equations
(17) and (18) imply that 0 < plim βˆOLS2 + 1 < 1, or −1 < plim βˆOLS2 < 0.
6This can be seen as follows: if 0 ≤ ση1η2 equation (17) implies that:

















< 1 because a˜11Var(z2) = 0.884 (see footnote 5). Therefore
equation (19) implies that plim βˆOLS2 < 0 if there is any displacement (β2 < 0).
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measurement error), we use robust and median regression techniques to estimate β2 and
γ.
3. Data
In our empirical analysis we use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retire-
ment in Europe (SHARE). The SHARE project started with wave 1 in 2004/05, collecting
information on the current socio–economic status (income, wealth, housing), health and
expectations of European individuals aged 50 and over and their partners. A first lon-
gitudinal follow–up was collected with wave 2 in 2006/7, when new countries joined
the project and a refresher sample was added to maintain the representativeness of the
survey. In 2008/2009 the third wave of data collection, known as SHARELIFE, asked
all previous respondents (waves 1 and 2) and their partners to provide information not
on their current situation but on their entire life–histories. The retrospective information
ranges from childhood health to relationships to housing to work careers.7 SHARELIFE
interviewed 15,170 females and 11,666 males in 17,901 households and was conducted in
thirteen European countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy,
France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Poland.
Our analytical sample consists of 3,590 males born between 1931 and 1952, aged 55-75
in the interview year of wave 2. We restrict the sample to males as we would need to
make many assumptions for broken careers, typical for women with children. The liter-
ature discussed in Section 1 focuses on males as well. In our sample selection, we drop
those individuals who never worked or did not report any wage in SHARELIFE (2,012
cases), and respondents aged below 55 or above 75 (2,581 cases) to have a sample con-
sisting of individuals around retirement. We keep persons that have been self-employed
at any stage during their career, but drop those that worked for less than 20 years (97
cases) to exclude the disabled. We exclude males for whom only one wage point is avail-
able (1,670 cases), and retirees with missing pension benefits or workers with missing
expected replacement rates (1,592 cases). We trim compounded labour income and pen-
sion wealth by 1% from above and below in each country to end up with our final sample
of 3,590 observations. All monetary amounts are expressed in PPP-adjusted 2006 German
Euros, irrespective of in which country and in which year these amounts were earned. To
estimate equation (16), we compute the following variables.
• Non–pension wealth, At, is mostly obtained from wave 2. We resort to information
from wave 1 only for those individuals who dropped out of the survey in wave 2
but were then retrieved in SHARELIFE. In our analysis we use both household net
worth and net financial wealth as dependent variables. According to Gale (1998,
p. 713) a narrow measure of non–pension wealth, such as financial wealth, may
be unable to detect much of the displacement, as pension wealth is accumulated
over a long period. On the other hand, Hurd et al. (2009, p. 10) argue that financial
7Börsch-Supan et al. (2011) characterizes the data and presents the first descriptive statistics.
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wealth is more liquid than real wealth and hence more prone to being displaced
by pension wealth. Our measure of net financial wealth is equal to gross financial
assets (bank accounts, government and corporate bonds, stocks, mutual funds, in-
dividual retirement accounts, contractual savings for housing and the face value of
life insurance policies) minus financial liabilities. Net worth is the sum of net finan-
cial wealth and real wealth, where the latter is the sum of the value of the primary
residence net of the mortgage, the value of other real estate, owned share of own
business and owned cars. Missing values for each of the components of wealth
are replaced by five simulated versions, following multiple imputation techniques
(Christelis, 2011). In total, for 56% of the analytical sample one of the separate com-
ponents of net worth has been imputed, although for less than 15% of the sample
more than one component was imputed. All equations are estimated using multiple
imputations techniques.




(1 + r)t−τEτ, is calculated from SHARELIFE.
The job history section in SHARELIFE asks the respondents to provide start and
end dates of each job the respondent has held, as well as the first monthly wage af-
ter taxes. For the self-employed, monthly income from work after taxes is asked in-
stead. The respondent also identifies his main job during his career. For the retirees,
the last monthly net wage (or, for the self-employed, net income from work) of the
main job is asked. For those that are still employed at the time of the SHARELIFE
interview, the current wage is asked instead. We use the data to construct a panel
with one observation per year per individual, from birth to the wave 2 interview
year. The wage path is obtained using linear interpolation between the first wage
on each job, the last wage of the main job and the current wage for the employed.
For those still working in wave 2, we use the wage in that year as an additional
point on the wage path.8 As for non–pension wealth, these wages have been im-
puted in case of missing values (9%). During unemployment years, we assign the
respondent a wage equal to 80% of their last earnings. We convert all incomes to
annual PPP-adjusted German Euros of 2006 following the procedure explained in
Trevisan et al. (2011). Period 1 is taken to be the start of the working career, and
we compound up to the wave 2 interview year for the employed9, and the year be-
fore receiving retirement benefits for the retired10, using an annual real interest rate
8One important difference between the first two survey waves is that wages and pensions were elicited
gross (before taxes) in wave 1, and net in wave 2, which is why we only use wave 2 information to generate
our main variables.
9We use the term employed to denote the non-retired, although it is not necessary to be actually em-
ployed in wave 2 due to e.g. unemployment. Also, this term includes the currently self-employed.
10For the retired, this means that the dependent variable is At − z1R, and hence these two components
are measured at different ages. We made this assumption to prevent correlated measurement errors, which
would otherwise (using At − z1t) obviously arise for the retired subsample. Moreover, we have selected
respondents around retirement, which means this assumption should not much affect our results.
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of 3%, as in Hurd et al. (2009) and Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003). After com-
pounding, we have a cross-sectional dataset, with one observation per individual,
as observed in the interview year of wave 2.




(1 + r)t−τEτ, which needs to be calculated only for the
employed sample, is computed under the assumption of constant real wages (yτ =
yt τ = t + 1, ..., R). Retirement starts in the in which the individual reaches his
expected retirement age, obtained from wave 2, or the statutory retirement age (65
in each country except France (60) and Czech Republic (62) in 2007, as reported in
Angelini et al. (2009)) in case of item non-response to that question. We use country-
specific 2006 life tables from the Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org) to
weight all future incomes by the probability of survival.




(1 + r)t−τBτ, for the retired is calculated under the as-
sumption of constant real pension benefits, which is more or less in line with pen-
sion systems in the countries we study. The level of benefits is taken primarily from
SHARELIFE, and wave 2 pension benefits are used in case of item non-response
(13% of the analytical sample). For the employed, we use the expected replacement
rate11 from wave 2, multiplied by current wage, to obtain expected pension bene-
fits12. Again, all future incomes are weighted by survival rates and we assume a
maximum age of 110.
• Pension wealth adjustment, Q(λ, t) is computed using expression 4, with r = ρ = 0.03
(or λ = 1.03−1).
• Explanatory variables, xt, include a set of indicator variables to capture differences
across households. Specifically, we include an indicator for higher education (ISCED
≥ 4, post-secondary and tertiary education), medium education (ISCED=3, sec-
ondary education), aged 55-60, aged 70-75, married, no children, self-reported bad
health, second earner in the household, and spells without work during the career.
In other specifications, we control additionally for inheritances received in the past
using both an indicator and the amount; an indicator for being retired; or character-
istics (education and health) of the spouse. All regressions have a full set of country
fixed effects, with Germany as the base country.
11The exact question to elicit the expected replacement rate for old age pensions, occupational pensions
or early retirement benefits is stated as follows: "Please think about the time in which you will start collect-
ing this pension. Approximately, what percentage of your last earnings will your pension amount to?". We
take the maximum replacement rate from these pension categories as the individual’s expected replace-
ment rate. Given our age selection (55-75), we believe that the employed respondents provide sensible
answers to this question.
12For those that retired between waves 2 and 3, we take their pension benefit as reported in SHARELIFE.
13
We emphasize that compounded labour income and pension wealth, z1t and z2t, for the
retired subsample are computed from two different sets of questions. Therefore, while
both are likely measured with error, these errors are less likely to be correlated. For
the working, by using the expected replacement rate, pension wealth is nearly a linear
function of current income, with a sample correlation of 0.83, and hence the measurement
errors are likely correlated. We use this observation to conduct a sensitivity analysis in
Section 4 by selecting only the retired subsample.
3.1. Sample characteristics
Table 1 shows sample statistics for the two main variables obtained from the retro-
spective survey, annual labour income and annual pension income, as well as for net
worth and financial wealth, by country and work status. We compute average annual
labour income as the sum of all annualized wages divided by years worked13; annual
pension income is equal to the sum of pension incomes until death divided by remaining
life expectancy.14 We emphasize that the amounts reported here are for one earner only,
hence household labour income or pension income is likely to be higher. Furthermore,
the amounts, although corrected for inflation and currency devaluations, could have been
earned already in the 1950’s, and hence are relatively low compared to current earnings.
The cross-country pattern of median labour incomes is encouraging, we believe, for the
reliability of retrospective data; countries like Poland and the Czech Republic have con-
siderably lower wages and pensions compared to Western European countries, while
wages and pensions in Switzerland are higher. Table 1 also makes clear that there are
likely to be cohort effects in earnings and, via the replacement rate, in pensions: those
still working in the wave 2 interview year have substantially higher wages and pensions
than those already retired.
We also investigate the dynamic properties of earnings by estimating age-earnings
profiles by country group: North represents Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands,
Mid-West includes Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France and Belgium, South includes
Spain, Italy and Greece and East represents Poland and Czech Republic. In particular, we
estimate a regression of the log of monthly real wage (in e1,000) on a 4th-order polyno-
mial in age, for both low and high educated individuals. We use a fixed-effects specifi-
cation to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. Figure 1 shows the implied age-earnings
profiles. Earnings for low-educated individuals are lower than for high-educated per-
sons, as expected. Moreover, we observe a more hump-shaped profile for high-educated,
with wages rising faster in early ages. From what we know from earlier literature, these
patterns are not surprising, and provide evidence in favor of retrospective earnings in-
14
Table 1: Medians by country and retirement status
Country Annual labour income Annual pension income Wealth Observations
Working Retired Working Retired Net worth Financial
Austria 20,786 16,236 21,151 13,209 180,990 17,698 123
Germany 24,226 17,922 21,999 11,669 221,174 36,426 365
Sweden 24,747 20,765 16,046 12,272 206,176 57,980 341
Netherlands 23,810 16,526 24,122 11,973 222,288 39,273 334
Spain 16,954 15,603 19,710 9,149 302,695 6,827 176
Italy 17,255 12,650 14,421 9,853 212,103 8,169 486
France 26,268 24,582 18,400 15,516 325,397 36,672 256
Denmark 23,778 19,153 14,701 9,524 216,381 69,687 328
Greece 22,914 16,304 16,695 12,939 216,650 2,917 119
Switzerland 38,930 33,455 25,051 20,434 305,083 99,882 221
Belgium 22,559 18,552 18,258 12,968 304,183 54,116 398
Czech Republic 11,375 9,369 8,226 5,794 107,005 8,218 305
Poland 8,507 8,056 7,754 5,349 58,597 1,946 138
Total 22,733 16,441 17,016 10,723 217,488 25,672 3,590
Table shows the median values for annualized labour and pension incomes obtained from the retrospective survey, by country
and retirement status, as well as the levels of wealth obtained from wave 2. All amounts are in PPP-adjusted German Euros of 2006.
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formation.15
Table 2 shows sample statistics for the remaining variables used in this study. 69% of
the sample is retired at the time of the wave 2 interview, while only 0.3% is unemployed.
On average, the males in our analytical sample have only one year of unemployment,
and have been working for 40 years. The vast majority is married, and 61% have a second
earner in the household.





Actual retirement age (retired) 59.1 4.6
Expected retirement age (working) 63.2 2.5
Actual replacement rate (%, retired) 70.1 35.0
Expected replacement rate (%, working) 66.4 17.4
Years worked 40.3 5.5
Years not worked 1.2 2.6
Gale’s Q 0.5 0.1
% High educated 29.7
% Medium educated 33.4
% Married 88.2
% Second earner 61.3
% Bad health 26.2
% Inheritance received 36.4
Amount inherited (× e1, 000) 14.2 49.4
Table shows the mean and standard deviation of household characteristics.
N=3,590 except for retired (N=2,487) or working (N=1,103) specific variables.
13Note that this is similar to our measure of compounded labour income, using r = 0 instead, and
dividing by years worked.
14Remaining life expectancy is calculated using the country-specific mortality rates, conditioning on sur-
vivorship until the real age at the wave 2 interview year.
15We do not correct for cohort effects and labor supply effects (e.g. reduced hours of work later in life).
Given our sample selection (20 year-of-birth cohorts and men with at least 20 years of work experience),
these are not likely to distort the age-earnings profiles much.
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4. Results
We estimate the model represented in equation (16) both using robust regression and
median regression techniques, as Gale (1998) does. Since wages and pension benefits
from wave 2 and the measures of non–pension wealth have been imputed five times in
case of missing values, we use multiple imputation techniques to obtain the correct coeffi-
cients and standard errors (Little and Rubin, 2002).16 The results are presented in Table 3.
Our controls include two age dummies17, marital status, presence of children, education,
health, the country of residence and indicators for whether in the family there has been
a second income earner and whether there were years of unemployment in the working
career, as well as country fixed effects (see Table A.6). For median regression, standard
errors are based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
Table 3: Estimates of the displacement effect
Robust regression Median regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Retired Old Full Retired Old
sample sample sample sample sample sample
Pension wealth -0.471*** -0.205** -0.173* -0.609*** -0.296 -0.306*
(0.0878) (0.0936) (0.0965) (0.151) (0.180) (0.177)
Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 2487 2415
p-value β2 = −1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
p-value Country effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Bootstrapped standard errors for median regression, 1000 replications.
Our results for the full sample imply an estimated offset18 between 47.1% and 60.9%
depending on the estimation method: the offset is significantly different from zero at all
conventional levels and significantly different from 100%, although not at the 1% level in
the case of median regression (columns (1) and (4) of Table 3). As Gale (1998), we also
find that robust regression estimates of the offset are qualitatively the same as median
regression estimates but quantitatively smaller. The control variables are mainly insignif-
icant, with the exception of the indicator for gaps in the career, resulting in less wealth,
and strongly significant age effects. Although insignificance of, for example, education
may seem surprising, we emphasize that education correlates with compounded labour
income, included in our regressions. The country-fixed effects are highly significant.
16If βˆm and Vˆm denote the vector of parameter estimates and variance matrix for imputation m, respec-


















which takes into account both within- and between-imputation variance.
17As we estimate a cross-sectional regression, we cannot distinguish between age, cohort and time effects.
18The offset is simply the negative of the estimated coefficient for pension wealth.
17
As argued in Section 2.1, the estimates for the full sample are likely to be biased, away
from zero due to the fact that measurement errors in z1t and z2t are possibly correlated
for the non–retired (cf. equation (17)) and towards zero due to measurement error in
pension wealth. Since these biases work in opposite direction, we can only hope that
these balance out on aggregate. In columns (2) and (5) we report the estimated crowd-
out for the group of retirees. For this group, as argued above, the correlation between
the measurement errors in compounded labour income and pension wealth (i.e. ση1η2
from Section 2.1) should be considerably smaller or even negligible for this group, and
hence, the estimate should only be affected by attenuation bias due to measurement error
in pension wealth. Therefore, we can consider the estimates for the group of retirees as a
lower bound for the true offset. Indeed, we find that the attenuation bias gives parameter
estimates towards zero, and hence a lower estimated offset compared to the full sample
results. The estimated displacement effect is significantly different from zero only with
robust regression.
One issue with selecting the sample of retirees is that, although we do not explicitly
model the retirement decision, it might be endogenous. Therefore, in columns (3) and (6),
we do not select the sample based on retirement status, which could lead to endogenous
sample selection and hence inconsistent parameter estimates, but using an age criterion:
those aged 60 or below are dropped independent of retirement status (in our sample av-
erage retirement age is 59.1, see Table 2). In the remaining group of 2415 males, around
90% is retired, compared to 70% in our baseline results. Effectively, for this old sample,
the effect of correlated measurement errors should be similar to selecting only the re-
tirees, which is confirmed by the parameter estimates. The estimated offset is between
17.3% and 30.6%, and is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 19
Table 4: Robustness checks displacement effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Financial Financial Financial Inheritances Partner’s Low High No occupational
wealth, full wealth, retired wealth, old received characteristics educated educated pensions
Robust regression -0.778*** -0.614*** -0.532*** -0.527*** -0.488*** -0.215* -0.833*** -0.380***
(0.0738) (0.0734) (0.0779) (0.0877) (0.0876) (0.122) (0.153) (0.121)
p-value β2 = −1 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.277 0.000
Median regression -0.870*** -0.692*** -0.618*** -0.618*** -0.660*** -0.275 -1.099*** -0.740***
(0.114) (0.121) (0.118) (0.163) (0.162) (0.192) (0.286) (0.226)
p-value β2 = −1 0.253 0.0130 0.001 0.0210 0.0420 0.000 0.729 0.253
Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 3590 3590 3590 1823
Standard errors in parentheses; 1000 bootstrap replications for median regression; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Table shows the coefficient for pension wealth from a regression similar to Table 3 with the following modifications:
(1) using financial wealth as dependent variable, full sample, (2) using financial wealth as dependent variable, retired sample,
(3) using financial wealth as dependent variable, old sample, (4) controlling for received inheritances (binary and amount),
(5) controlling for partner’s education and health status, (6) and (7) interacting all covariates with the high-education dummy
and (8) excluding countries with large occupational pensions
19For both the samples of retirees and older males, the difference with the full sample estimates might be
partly driven by cohort effects, although these are likely small given our age restriction in the full sample
(55-75 years old).
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We check the robustness of our results in Table 4 (see Tables A.7 and A.8 for detailed
results). In columns (1) to (3) we consider net financial wealth rather than total net worth
and we include housing wealth among the control variables.20 The reason for doing so is
that, according to Hurd et al. (2009), real wealth is mostly illiquid and its accumulation is
likely to be driven by motives other than retirement planning. Housing in particular may
be a consumption rather than an investment good, and as such affect the displacement
effect. When we use financial wealth, for the full sample we cannot reject the hypothesis
of full displacement using median regression. This result is in contrast with the findings
of Gale (1998), according to which the offset is larger when using broader measures of
wealth. For the sample of retirees, we find that for financial wealth the displacement
effect is significantly different from zero, while for net worth this was true only using
robust regression. Using the reasoning of Section 2.1, as ση1η2 ≈ 0, these estimates may
be interpreted as lower bounds for the true offset, and hence we reject the hypothesis of
no displacement. As expected, the offset for the old sample is very similar in magnitude
to that estimated for the sample of retirees.
In the remaining robustness checks we focus only on the full sample because the re-
sults are qualitatively unchanged when we select the retirees or the old sample (they are
available upon request from the authors). In columns (4) and (5) we add to our speci-
fication other explanatory variables that might be relevant in determining non–pension
wealth. In particular, in column (4) we control for whether the individual has ever re-
ceived inheritances or gifts worth more than e5,000 during his life and the total amount
received. Indeed, for some individuals inheritances and monetary gifts might be an im-
portant component of non–pension wealth. Our results show that, although these vari-
ables are highly significant with the expected positive sign (see Tables A.7 and A.8), the
estimated offset is still in the same range as before and significantly different from 0 and
100%. Column (5) shows that including controls for the education level and health status
of the partner does not affect our main results. Changing the fixed parameters r and ρ to
2% (4%) does not affect the qualitative results (not reported); the estimated offset equals
23.6% (87.7%) using robust regressions, significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
As in Gale (1998) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011), in columns (6) and (7) we inter-
act all covariates with the high-education dummy, and report the estimated displacement
effect for the high- and low educated groups21. We find that the offset is not significantly
different from 100% for the highly educated, while the displacement effect is substan-
tially lower in absolute value terms and not significantly different from zero offset for
the less-educated sample. This result can be explained by the fact that individuals with
higher education are more likely to be financially literate and to plan for retirement, while
less educated individuals are more likely to procrastinate (see e.g. Laibson et al. (1998)).
20We have carried out our estimations including other forms of non–financial wealth as well as not con-
trolling for housing wealth. The results are virtually unchanged (they are available upon request from the
authors).
21The hypothesis of equal slope coefficients across education groups cannot be rejected for median re-
gression (p = 0.326) and is marginally rejected for robust regression (p = 0.044).
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Finally, in column (8) we exclude those countries for which occupational pensions
are typically a substantial share of pension income for retirees: Germany, Sweden, Den-
mark, the Netherlands and Belgium. In these countries, pensions may be seen as a form
of private wealth, causing wrong inference on the displacement effect. The estimated
crowd-out is about 10 percentage points lower compared to our baseline result using ro-
bust regression, and 15 percentage points higher using median regression. Overall, the
results do not seem to be driven by the type of pension system in a particular country.
The results are also robust to leaving one country out at the time (not reported). Us-
ing robust regression, the estimated displacement effect ranges between 38.6% when The
Netherlands is left out of the analysis, to 57.5% when leaving out Italy, all significantly
different from zero at the 1% level.
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Figure 2 shows the displacement effect by country group22, where North represents
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands; Mid-West represents Austria, Germany, Switzer-
land, France and Belgium; South includes Spain, Italy and Greece and East represents
Poland and Czech Republic. The estimates are obtained using robust regressions, and
we plot 90% confidence intervals around the point estimates. In the Northern coun-
tries the extent of displacement of net worth is the highest (91%), and crowd-out is least
in the South (11%), although the confidence intervals are wide. The pattern is similar
when looking at financial wealth, although the offset is the lowest in the Eastern coun-
tries. More generous welfare systems (including social security) in the Northern countries
could reduce the need to save for other reasons than retirement, such as precautionary
savings. Also, more developed capital markets are likely to relax liquidity constraints.
22The sample sizes are too small to consider country-specific analysis.
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For these reasons, the displacement effect could be higher in the Northern countries com-
pared to the Southern or Eastern European countries.
Another explanation of these findings can be found in the cross-country studies on
Financial Literacy around the World23 (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011). These “FLat World”
studies investigate responses to three comparable financial literacy questions in country-
specific socio-economic surveys, focusing on the concepts of interest rates, inflation and
risk diversification. The results show that the Netherlands (Alessie et al., 2011) and Swe-
den (Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh, 2011) score relatively well with 46.2% and 26.7%
of respondents aged 25-65 answering all three questions correctly24. In Germany 56.8%
of the sample provides three correct answers (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi, 2011). In Italy,
28.3% answers all correctly (Fornero and Monticone, 2011), while in Russia25 only 3.4%
answers all correctly (Klapper and Panos, 2011). Jappelli (2010) conducts a panel data
study using data from the International Institute for Management Development’s World
Competitiveness Yearbook (IMD-WCY). Jappelli finds a positive relationship between a
country’s GDP per capita and its economic literacy26 using fixed-effects regressions, as
well as the highest literacy scores in Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Swe-
den and the lowest scores in Poland, Italy and Spain. The evidence presented is certainly
not exhaustive, but still seems to suggest more literate households in the Northern or
Western countries, and less literacy in the Southern or Eastern countries, consistent with
our results given the strong correlation between financial literacy and planning for retire-
ment found in these same studies. Still, our cross-country results should be treated with
caution, as the confidence intervals are wide, and, in fact, the group-specific estimates are
never significantly different from the pooled displacement effect.
Overall, our results show that there is heterogeneity in the estimated offset across
different groups of the population. However, the displacement effect is almost always
significantly different from zero, indicating some degree of crowding out of private sav-
ings by pensions.
4.1. The endogeneity of pension wealth
Although we have suggested an approach to limit the effect of measurement error,
our results might still be biased due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. For
23See the special issue of the Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Volume 10, Issue 4 (2011).
24The interest rate question in Sweden was considerably more difficult compared to the other countries;
the percentage of no question correct is around 10% as in the Netherlands and Germany.
25We should be cautious with comparing the Russian results. First, the Czech Republic and Poland might
well score differently compared to Russia. Second, the question on inflation literacy in Russia is framed
differently from the other studies but is contentwise similar, while the risk diversification question asks
Russians to rate the risks of different portfolio, and the remaining countries to give a true/false answer,
which may bias the results against the Russians. Also, the answer category “Refuse to answer” was missing
in all Russian questions.
26The literacy scores in the IMD-WCY are obtained by asking business leaders’s and country experts’s
opinions on economic literacy in the population, instead of using household surveys as done in the “FLat
World” studies.
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example, taste for saving is likely to influence both pension wealth and private savings.
Since both the dependent and the endogenous right-hand-side variable are positively af-
fected by the unobserved taste for saving, the estimates of the displacement effect that
we have obtained so far are likely to be attenuated. Therefore, we can still conclude that
there is crowding out but its magnitude might be underestimated.
We try to overcome this endogeneity problem by using an instrumental variable iden-
tification strategy, which at the same time should reduce the impact of measurement er-
ror. We construct an instrument in the same spirit of that of Engelhardt and Kumar (2011),
exploiting institutional differences across countries and groups of individuals. First, we
compute median27 pension benefits by country and employment sector (employee, civil
servant and self-employed), relying on the information from the second wave of SHARE.
Second, for each individual we calculate a “potential” pension wealth variable, using the
relevant median benefit and the statutory retirement age that was in place at the time of
retirement. Therefore, there are three sources of variation in our instrument: the country
of residence, the sector of employment and the legal retirement age in place when leaving
employment. For the validity of the instrument, we need to assume that, conditional on
demographic characteristics, education, wealth and the country of residence, workers do
not sort across employment sectors based on the taste for saving which is included in the
error term. This assumption is similar to that made by Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003)
and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011). Note that the instrument does not depend on any
other individual characteristics which could be correlated with unobserved heterogene-
ity. We report results for our instrumental variables estimation in Table 5 (see Table A.9
for the detailed results). There are two cautionary notes to bear in mind. First, we only
present the results of IV quantile regression because the theory for IV robust regression
is non–standard and we have not yet found a way to apply it to our context. Second,
we employ the identification strategy of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), which pro-
vides consistent but imprecise estimates, a fact that has been noted by Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2008) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011) as well. Therefore, we focus only
on the point estimates and not on the confidence intervals.
As expected, the estimated displacement effect is higher when correcting for the at-
tenuation biases from endogeneity and measurement error, both if we focus on the full
sample and if we consider only the retirees or the old sample. The partial F-statistic of the
first stage (OLS) regression exceeds the “weak” instrument threshold of 10. The point es-
timates suggest full displacement, although the large standard errors yield insignificant
results for pension wealth.
27Using average pension income by country and employment sector gives similar results, available upon
request.
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Table 5: IV Median regression estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Full sample Retired sample Old sample
Pension Wealth -1.232 -0.622 -0.955
(0.876) (0.863) (0.813)
p-value β2 = −1 0.804 0.684 0.960
F-statistic first stage 41.895 31.232 38.567
Observations 3590 2487 2415
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; 1000 replications. Table shows the
coefficient for pension wealth from an Instrumental Variable median regression,
instrumenting pension wealth. See the text for details on the instrument.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we use SHARE data to come up with new estimates of the displace-
ment effect of pensions on household wealth. The third wave of this survey, known
as SHARELIFE, collects retrospective data on lifetime earnings, which can be linked to
data on household wealth and subjective data on the expected replacement rate and re-
tirement age collected in previous waves. Consequently, we are able to approximate in
a convincing way the main variables needed to estimate the extent of crowding out be-
tween pension wealth and private wealth. In particular, we can compute both the present
value of past and future income and pension wealth. According to our robust (median)
regression results, each euro of pension wealth is associated with a 47 (61) cent decline
in non–pension wealth. However, these results should be interpreted with caution: al-
though we suggest an approach to limit the effects of correlated measurement errors in
lifetime earnings and pension wealth, our estimates could still be biased and the direc-
tion of the bias is unclear. As Gale (1998, p. 720) stated, “pension wealth data are of generally
poor quality; all methods of calculating pension wealth in defined benefit plans are likely to create
measurement error”. For this reason, we estimate our model also on a sample of retirees
and older households, for whom the information on lifetime earnings and pension wealth
comes from two different sources. For this group measurement error, although present, is
likely to be uncorrelated and the direction of the bias in our preferred specification is thus
clear: parameter estimates are attenuated and, therefore, they can provide lower bounds
to the true offset. We find that the lower bounds for the crowd–out are significantly dif-
ferent from zero and they range between 17% and 30%, depending on the estimation
method.
We also find that the extent of the crowding out effect differs across education groups:
for the low educated, we do not find any evidence of displacement whereas for the high
educated pension wealth completely crowds out private wealth. Moreover, the level of
displacement is limited in the Mediterranean and Eastern European countries. The IV es-
timates, instrumenting pension wealth to account for omitted variable bias, suggest full
displacement although estimated with less precision.
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Our results shed light on the impact of recent and future pension reforms in Europe.
The main results suggest that European households will react to reductions in pensions
by increasing private savings, although not strong enough to smooth consumption over
the life–cycle. Government policy should focus especially on the less-educated and per-
haps financially illiterate households, for which we have shown limited displacement.
Although we have suggested strategies to address the issues of measurement error
and unobserved heterogeneity, more work needs to be done. Most notably, future waves
of SHARE can be used to construct a panel data set, with which unobservable household
characteristics as well as the choice of retirement date can be addressed.
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A. Detailed estimation results
Table A.6: Full table estimation results
Robust regression Median regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Retired Old Full Retired Old
sample sample sample sample sample sample
Pension wealth -0.471*** -0.205** -0.173* -0.609*** -0.296 -0.306*
(0.0878) (0.0936) (0.0965) (0.151) (0.180) (0.177)
Age 55-60 -1.406*** -0.538** -1.409*** -0.359
(0.155) (0.207) (0.173) (0.226)
Age 70-75 1.797*** 1.483*** 1.674*** 1.614*** 1.347*** 1.505***
(0.172) (0.161) (0.167) (0.177) (0.175) (0.187)
Second earner 0.128 0.230 0.206 0.175 0.189 0.270
(0.151) (0.159) (0.171) (0.167) (0.191) (0.188)
Married 0.403* 0.148 0.173 0.332 -0.0066 -0.070
(0.233) (0.247) (0.267) (0.275) (0.292) (0.304)
No children 0.355 0.170 0.503 0.469* 0.0579 0.564
(0.254) (0.262) (0.289) (0.282) (0.274) (0.293)
High educated 0.0854 0.229 0.100 -0.0755 0.177 0.133
(0.175) (0.200) (0.202) (0.197) (0.233) (0.234)
Medium educated 0.255 0.229 0.362 0.139 0.233 0.340
(0.163) (0.186) (0.195) (0.175) (0.205) (0.211)
Bad health 0.120 0.0175 0.179 0.0712 0.0674 0.167
(0.149) (0.152) (0.170) (0.143) (0.165) (0.163)
Gaps in career -0.824*** -0.109 -0.236 -0.756*** -0.174 -0.275
(0.146) (0.180) (0.183) (0.164) (0.208) (0.211)
Sweden -0.820*** -0.882** -0.880*** -0.992** -1.104** -1.382***
(0.287) (0.341) (0.328) (0.412) (0.495) (0.459)
Denmark -0.311 -0.743** -0.716** -0.457 -0.831* -1.020**
(0.286) (0.321) (0.330) (0.369) (0.458) (0.428)
Netherlands 0.528* 0.467 0.590* 0.521 0.365 0.481
(0.285) (0.322) (0.333) (0.336) (0.356) (0.346)
Belgium 1.397*** 1.172*** 1.446*** 1.522*** 1.244*** 1.590***
(0.279) (0.300) (0.316) (0.356) (0.408) (0.377)
France 0.755** 0.295 0.413 0.337 -0.270 -0.267
(0.312) (0.340) (0.389) (0.463) (0.510) (0.629)
Switzerland -5.575*** -4.633*** -4.734*** -5.595*** -4.275*** -5.045***
(0.324) (0.389) (0.370) (0.589) (0.741) (0.628)
Austria 0.628 0.362 0.245 0.743 0.213 0.197
(0.389) (0.409) (0.442) (0.477) (0.507) (0.549)
Spain 1.649*** 1.825*** 1.763*** 1.314** 1.544** 1.504**
(0.371) (0.397) (0.437) (0.506) (0.599) (0.585)
Italy 2.477*** 2.237*** 2.563*** 2.325*** 2.171*** 2.431***
(0.274) (0.293) (0.315) (0.302) (0.350) (0.352)
Greece 2.053*** 1.802*** 2.100*** 1.950*** 1.401* 1.345*
(0.400) (0.465) (0.490) (0.742) (0.747) (0.745)
Poland 3.027*** 2.563*** 2.608*** 2.985*** 2.355*** 2.469***
(0.377) (0.408) (0.472) (0.330) (0.340) (0.363)
Czech Republic 2.201*** 1.979*** 2.171*** 2.102*** 1.920*** 2.055***
(0.305) (0.322) (0.339) (0.286) (0.311) (0.294)
Constant -4.786*** -4.664*** -5.128*** -4.385*** -4.244*** -4.559***
(0.329) (0.358) (0.372) (0.374) (0.427) (0.418)
Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 2487 2415
p-value β2 = −1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
p-value Country effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Bootstrapped standard errors for median regression, 1000 replications
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Table A.7: Full estimation results robustness checks, robust regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Financial Financial Financial Inheritances Partner’s Low High No occupational
wealth, full wealth, retired wealth, old received characteristics educated educated pensions
Pension wealth -0.778*** -0.614*** -0.532*** -0.527*** -0.488*** -0.215* -0.833*** -0.380***
(0.0738) (0.0734) (0.0779) (0.0877) (0.0876) (0.122) (0.153) (0.121)
Age 55-60 -1.508*** -0.653*** -1.421*** -1.424*** -1.340*** -1.537*** -1.397***
(0.127) (0.159) (0.154) (0.155) (0.178) (0.293) (0.204)
Age 70-75 1.898*** 1.579*** 1.784*** 1.820*** 1.812*** 1.733*** 1.862*** 1.390***
(0.144) (0.125) (0.135) (0.171) (0.172) (0.206) (0.341) (0.240)
Second earner -0.142 -0.0818 -0.0961 0.0777 -0.117 0.183 0.151 0.215
(0.123) (0.123) (0.137) (0.149) (0.168) (0.175) (0.280) (0.203)
Married 0.0023 -0.117 -0.153 0.412* 0.255 0.276 0.558 0.143
(0.190) (0.191) (0.211) (0.230) (0.242) (0.271) (0.427) (0.331)
No children 0.355* 0.239 0.394* 0.331 0.377 0.346 0.0912 0.268
(0.204) (0.205) (0.233) (0.251) (0.252) (0.290) (0.489) (0.345)
High educated -0.677*** -0.397*** -0.557*** -0.0405 -0.0662 0.108
(0.142) (0.146) (0.162) (0.174) (0.183) (0.243)
Medium educated 0.0527 0.0511 0.134 0.201 0.159 0.152
(0.136) (0.137) (0.156) (0.161) (0.165) (0.221)
Bad health 0.279** 0.180 0.292** 0.197 0.153 0.148 0.0378 0.287
(0.123) (0.116) (0.133) (0.148) (0.150) (0.169) (0.327) (0.194)
Gaps in career -0.810*** 0.0087 -0.234 -0.826*** -0.835*** -0.654*** -1.109*** -0.865***
(0.123) (0.138) (0.149) (0.145) (0.145) (0.174) (0.270) (0.204)
Sweden -0.637*** -0.451* -0.749*** -0.824*** -0.787*** -1.356*** -0.0327
(0.237) (0.257) (0.260) (0.290) (0.289) (0.364) (0.522)
Denmark -0.243 -0.646** -0.725*** -0.254 -0.320 -0.395 -0.206
(0.237) (0.249) (0.263) (0.284) (0.286) (0.364) (0.455)
Netherlands 0.520** 0.396 0.431 0.600** 0.604** 0.217 0.819*
(0.239) (0.259) (0.275) (0.282) (0.288) (0.363) (0.473)
Belgium 0.868*** 0.817*** 0.871*** 1.430*** 1.431*** 1.148*** 1.626***
(0.229) (0.230) (0.253) (0.274) (0.279) (0.348) (0.435)
France -0.223 -0.720*** -0.461 0.830*** 0.818*** 0.829** 0.0730
(0.259) (0.266) (0.318) (0.307) (0.312) (0.381) (0.552)
Switzerland -5.555*** -4.195*** -4.753*** -5.695*** -5.517*** -6.236*** -4.760*** -6.393***
(0.274) (0.309) (0.313) (0.326) (0.324) (0.406) (0.518) (0.356)
Austria 0.767** 0.771** 0.560 0.786** 0.720* 0.156 1.537** -0.0631
(0.318) (0.318) (0.353) (0.383) (0.388) (0.487) (0.648) (0.398)
Spain 0.257 0.340 0.211 1.807*** 1.739*** 1.219*** 3.225*** 0.940**
(0.295) (0.299) (0.327) (0.366) (0.369) (0.415) (0.955) (0.375)
Italy 1.557*** 1.397*** 1.572*** 2.565*** 2.551*** 2.165*** 3.039*** 1.765***
(0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.270) (0.276) (0.316) (0.698) (0.291)
Greece 1.707*** 1.447*** 1.639*** 1.987*** 2.018*** 1.637*** 2.482*** 1.343***
(0.328) (0.358) (0.392) (0.396) (0.401) (0.486) (0.703) (0.398)
Poland 3.735*** 3.107*** 3.087*** 3.185*** 3.044*** 3.000*** 2.922*** 2.299***
(0.312) (0.318) (0.380) (0.373) (0.377) (0.457) (0.712) (0.401)
Czech Republic 2.459*** 2.161*** 2.267*** 2.296*** 2.240*** 2.021*** 2.249*** 1.470***
(0.248) (0.249) (0.271) (0.300) (0.305) (0.367) (0.585) (0.336)
Constant -5.233*** -5.083*** -5.364*** -4.964*** -4.518*** -4.679*** -4.420*** -3.890***
(0.274) (0.279) (0.297) (0.328) (0.372) (0.396) (0.514) (0.436)












Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 3590 3590 3590 1823
p-value β2 = −1 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.277 0.000
p-value Country 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
effects
See Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
In column (8), France is used as the baseline country.
Table A.8: Full estimation results robustness checks, median regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Financial Financial Financial Inheritances Partner’s Low High No occupational
wealth, full wealth, retired wealth, old received characteristics educated educated pensions
Pension wealth -0.870*** -0.692*** -0.618*** -0.618*** -0.660*** -0.275 -1.099*** -0.740***
(0.114) (0.121) (0.118) (0.163) (0.162) (0.192) (0.286) (0.226)
Age 55-60 -1.477*** -0.433*** -1.399*** -1.483*** -1.238*** -1.943*** -1.390***
(0.154) (0.163) (0.170) (0.184) (0.196) (0.404) (0.217)
Age 70-75 1.948*** 1.776*** 1.891*** 1.674*** 1.629*** 1.550*** 1.652*** 1.207***
(0.143) (0.132) (0.138) (0.177) (0.186) (0.209) (0.437) (0.216)
Second earner -0.143 -0.144 -0.0901 0.119 -0.102 0.165 0.258 0.423**
(0.145) (0.145) (0.162) (0.167) (0.184) (0.185) (0.406) (0.211)
Married -0.128 -0.110 -0.194 0.348 0.190 0.182 0.524 -0.178
(0.203) (0.196) (0.215) (0.253) (0.281) (0.286) (0.673) (0.378)
No children 0.226 0.216 0.267 0.290 0.522* 0.407 0.179 0.180
(0.222) (0.197) (0.197) (0.249) (0.290) (0.277) (0.617) (0.347)
High educated -0.818*** -0.604*** -0.717*** -0.182 -0.267 0.0925
(0.171) (0.174) (0.198) (0.206) (0.204) (0.263)
Medium educated -0.0997 -0.0322 0.0255 0.131 0.0844 0.0550
(0.141) (0.136) (0.150) (0.168) (0.177) (0.214)
Bad health 0.206 0.167 0.231 0.134 0.102 0.140 -0.262 0.163
(0.126) (0.119) (0.140) (0.136) (0.145) (0.169) (0.391) (0.180)
Gaps in career -0.796*** -0.0446 -0.237 -0.796*** -0.780*** -0.617*** -0.982** -0.742***
(0.143) (0.136) (0.162) (0.168) (0.175) (0.185) (0.384) (0.210)
Sweden -1.376*** -1.255*** -1.596*** -0.947** -1.077** -1.700*** -0.326
(0.299) (0.385) (0.352) (0.396) (0.413) (0.472) (0.683)
Denmark -0.476* -0.722** -0.945*** -0.352 -0.490 -0.429 -0.646
(0.254) (0.341) (0.326) (0.357) (0.370) (0.433) (0.626)
Netherlands 0.531** 0.373 0.412 0.693** 0.592* 0.349 0.904
(0.230) (0.280) (0.256) (0.314) (0.320) (0.373) (0.577)
Belgium 0.815*** 0.788*** 0.843*** 1.537*** 1.543*** 1.576*** 1.174*
(0.234) (0.269) (0.272) (0.374) (0.395) (0.407) (0.619)
France -0.991** -1.484*** -1.453*** 0.399 0.462 0.515 -0.240
(0.416) (0.511) (0.613) (0.408) (0.456) (0.438) (1.000)
Switzerland -6.319*** -4.428*** -5.137*** -5.800*** -5.586*** -6.190*** -5.061*** -5.889***
(0.537) (0.455) (0.648) (0.595) (0.603) (0.766) (1.012) (0.650)
Austria 0.593 0.303 0.0036 0.944** 0.790 0.519 1.455 0.367
(0.492) (0.526) (0.495) (0.418) (0.480) (0.527) (0.938) (0.581)
Spain -0.215 -0.0919 -0.127 1.587*** 1.430** 1.065* 2.303 1.093*
(0.400) (0.406) (0.413) (0.514) (0.581) (0.596) (1.522) (0.586)
Italy 1.677*** 1.501*** 1.698*** 2.487*** 2.406*** 2.122*** 2.754*** 2.062***
(0.227) (0.222) (0.228) (0.297) (0.328) (0.341) (0.803) (0.401)
Greece 0.935* 0.858* 0.886* 1.503** 1.864** 1.343* 2.703* 1.354*
(0.506) (0.486) (0.475) (0.726) (0.772) (0.804) (1.578) (0.692)
Poland 3.615*** 2.954*** 3.083*** 3.188*** 2.949*** 2.973*** 2.711*** 2.480***
(0.260) (0.248) (0.288) (0.333) (0.342) (0.363) (0.696) (0.435)
Czech Republic 2.284*** 2.163*** 2.201*** 2.291*** 2.096*** 2.141*** 1.728*** 1.667***
(0.217) (0.213) (0.217) (0.293) (0.296) (0.335) (0.619) (0.520)
Constant -4.669*** -4.797*** -4.945*** -4.691*** -3.992*** -4.507*** -3.681*** -3.528***
(0.286) (0.309) (0.283) (0.383) (0.432) (0.442) (0.860) (0.586)












Observations 3590 2487 2415 3590 3590 3590 3590 1823
p-value β2 = −1 0.253 0.0130 0.001 0.0210 0.0420 0.000 0.729 0.253
p-value Country 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
effects
See Table 4. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 1000 replications; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
In column (8), France is used as the baseline country.
Table A.9: IV Quantile regression estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Full Retired Old
sample sample sample
Pension Wealth -1.232 -0.622 -0.955
(0.876) (0.863) (0.813)
Age 55-60 -0.144*** -0.044
(0.022) (0.027)
Age 70-75 0.179*** 0.136*** 0.172***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.038)
Second earner 0.012 0.017 0.026
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
Married 0.037 0.006 0.003
(0.031) (0.034) (0.035)
No children 0.050* -0.001 0.054*
(0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
High educated 0.014 0.031 0.029
(0.040) (0.045) (0.043)
Medium educated 0.030 0.029 0.045
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Bad Health 0.005 0.001 0.014
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Gaps in career -0.082*** -0.021 -0.036
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
Civil servant 0.038 0.031 0.024
(0.033) (0.030) (0.035)
Employee -0.022 -0.016 -0.037
(0.028) (0.029) (0.032)
Sweden -0.099** -0.115** -0.111**
(0.040) (0.046) (0.045)
Netherlands 0.049 0.029 0.067*
(0.032) (0.038) (0.036)
Austria 0.075 0.016 0.019
(0.051) (0.054) (0.058)
Switzerland -0.521*** -0.425*** -0.435***
(0.094) (0.114) (0.099)
Spain 0.141*** 0.151** 0.156***
(0.051) (0.059) (0.058)
Italy 0.225*** 0.207*** 0.239***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.037)
France 0.037 -0.020 -0.001
(0.050) (0.063) (0.072)
Denmark -0.077 -0.109* -0.124**
(0.056) (0.058) (0.053)
Belgium 0.149*** 0.130*** 0.182***
(0.034) (0.043) (0.042)
Greece 0.173*** 0.125* 0.135*
(0.066) (0.072) (0.073)
Czech Republic 0.161** 0.162** 0.156**
(0.079) (0.073) (0.071)
Poland 0.226*** 0.187** 0.198***
(0.084) (0.076) (0.076)
Constant -0.366*** -0.381*** -0.382***
(0.110) (0.100) (0.097)
Observations 3590 2487 2415
p-value β2 = −1 0.804 0.684 0.960
p-value Country effects 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-statistic first stage 41.895 31.232 38.567
p-value first stage 0.000 0.000 0.000
See Table 5. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses;
1000 replications. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Dependent and endogenous RHS variable divided by 10
B. Advantages of retrospective information
In this appendix, we discuss the advantage of retrospective earnings information com-
pared to the traditional approach, used by, amongst others, Gale (1998). Our main interest
is in estimating the parameter β2, the displacement effect, in the regression equation
A = z1β1 + z2β2 + x′γ + ε
where A denotes private wealth, z1 permanent income, z2 pension wealth and x′ a vector
of controls. Using retrospective earnings data from SHARELIFE, z1 is a one-dimensional
measure of lifetime income, measured with error. Using the approach of Gale (1998), z1β1
is replaced by g′1δ1, where g
′
1 is a vector of variables proxying lifetime income, consist-
ing of education, age, current income, marital status and the expected age of retirement.
Hence, g′1 is a multi-dimensional measure of lifetime income, again measured with error.
The economic model presented in Section 2 provides a value for β1 = 1, which we can
use to estimate a restricted model, such that we can sign the direction of the bias in the
estimated displacement effect. Instead, economic theory does not provide any intuition
regarding the magnitude of the elements in δ1, and hence a restricted estimator is not
feasible.
The SHARE survey contains enough information to estimate Gale’s model on the sam-
ple of non-retirees.28 An important impedient to this approach is that SHARE asks in-
dividuals to report an expected replacement rate of pension benefits. Expected pension
benefits can then simply be computed by multiplying this replacement rate by current in-
come. In contrast, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) used by Gale asks respondents
to provide an expected money amount of pension benefits.29 This difference in survey
questions has important consequences for estimating Gale (1998)’s model: using SHARE
data, pension wealth is a linear function of current income, and hence the measurement
error in pension wealth correlates with the measurement error in g1. Using the SCF, one
may reasonably argue that the measurement errors in g1 and z2 are uncorrelated. The
derivation of Section 2.1 clearly shows that this correlation biases the coefficients further
away from the true values.
Table B.10 shows the results of estimating Gale (1998)’s model using SHARE data,
without using any retrospective earnings information, for the sample of non-retirees. In
column (I), we proxy permanent income with Age, monthly real income (in e000’s), ed-
ucation, marital status, a dummy for a second earner in the household, and the expected
28Note that the approach of Gale (1998) is not suitable for the sample of retirees, as current labour income
is not observed for this sample, except for the case where individuals are followed repeatedly over time
and retire in the period surveyed. Gale indeed estimates his model for the sample of non-retirees.
29Given the different institutions between countries in Europe, we believe that the replacement rate is
indeed the appropriate pension income measure to elicit in a multi-country survey. The money amount
may be more appropriate in a single-country survey, although in, for instance, The Netherlands and Italy,
the replacement rate is the construct alluded to in political and popular debate.
age of retirement. In column (II), we additionally include interactions between age and
income as well as education and income.
Table B.10 shows that the estimated displacement effect is positive and not signif-
icantly different from zero using Gale (1998)’s approach with SHARE data. The bias
towards zero, compared to the model’s prediction, is most likely driven by correlated
measurement errors between pension wealth and current income, as predicted in Sec-
tion 2.1 (see equation 14). In column (II), the marginal effect of income for a 60-year
old, high educated respondent equals 0.43, significantly different from zero (p=0.004),
which is comparable to the effect of income in column (I). We conclude that one cannot
use SHARE data to estimate the displacement effect, due to the presence of measure-
ment errors. The approach we suggest in this paper, combining economic theory with
retrospective earnings information, does allow for the identification of the displacement
effect.
Table B.10: Gale’s regression
(1) (2)
Variables Gale’s model Gale’s model
with interactions
Pension wealth 0.150 0.135
(0.132) (0.133)




High educated 0.836*** 0.503
(0.196) (0.368)
Medium educated 0.389** -0.251
(0.169) (0.363)
Age x Income 0.0143
(0.0240)
High educated x Income 0.224
(0.156)




No children 0.0251 -0.00680
(0.275) (0.258)
Bad health -0.211 -0.202
(0.179) (0.178)
Second earner -0.101 -0.0874
(0.177) (0.172)





























p-value g1 0.000 0.000
p-value Country effects 0.000 0.002
Robust regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
g1 : Age, Income, Expected retirement age, Education, Age×Income, Education×Income
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